A surprising contact on the professional network. A proposal of work from a recruiter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of political reports for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or privileged information. Compensation in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Massive Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 the agency's director said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, industrial, military and technological secrets. But a new campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying alert was distributed on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Changes
In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media assists the wider public better identify interactions with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service aims for public figures to understand that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, though the recent actions occur after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been accused of working for China – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced previous legislation resulted in warnings that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Strategic Goals
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk significant criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if somebody participates in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs even less. Yet the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the Britain's approach to China on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or genocide was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, engaging 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis told MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean an individual quickly peripheral turning important.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the Western nations at a level under the point of outright war. China has increased its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent efforts to find secret informants on UK politics online because it wants to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.